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Abstract
While economic growth has lifted more people from poverty than in
any prior period, world market shocks of the 1970s and 1980s have caused
a massive realignment in country policies, and future growth in population
and income are expected to place heavy burdens on world resources. Re-
cently, it has been suggested that a food crisis may be forthcoming as food
production per capita has stagnated, risking a reversal of the long-term
decline in the real price of food. This paper focuses on food security in
this context, and concludes that a rise in the real price of food is likely, but
not of a magnitude to create a food crisis. Nevertheless, those already in
poverty may be placed at additional risk of nutritional deprivation. Poli-
cies for alleviating this possibility are available, but they entail more than
just increasing food production.
1 Introduction
Economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century has lifted more peo-
ple out of poverty than in any prior period, although large gaps remain in the
wealth distribution among nations. The highest output countries were approx-
imately 36 times richer than the lowest output countries in 1994, and over 1.2
billion people are estimated to live on incomes of a dollar a day or less (World
Bank, 1996a). Thus, a large portion of the worlds population expend a relatively
small share of their total income on food and are relatively unaffected by the
long-term trend and shorter-term cycles in world food supplies, while at least one
billion people are at serious nutritional risk. Recently, concern has arisen that the
world may be entering a period of food shortages. World agricultural production
*Roe is professor, Department of Applied Economics and Director, Center for Political
Economy. Gopinath is research associate, University of Minnesota, stationed at USDA/ERS,
Washington D.C. Invited paper to the 2nd International Crop Science Congress, November
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1per capita has remained flat since 1985, total factor productivity in the leading
agricultural exporting countries has trended downward as have public supported
investments in agricultural F&D. At the same time, world stocks of grains have
fallen to all time lows in 1995/96 and cereal prices appear to be rising. The World
Bank estimates that the world’s population will increase by 3.7 billion between
1990 and 2030. To meet the needs of that growing population worldwide, food
production will have to double, industrial output and energy will have to triple
world-wide. Industrial output and energy use will have to increase five fold to
cope with population growth in the developing countries.
Can the world’s economy accommodate these large changes without increasing
the number and worsening the condition of the poor? In answering this question it
must be recognized that the world’s economy has undergone fundamental changes
in the last two decades which, for the most part, have increased average well-
being.
The last two decades have been exceptionally turbulent. The world trade
shocks to primary commodities of the 1970’s, the flood of petro-dollars into world
capital markets, and the ensuing debt crises of the 1980’s ushered in forces for a
massive realignment of economic policy, particularly among countries that could
no longer shelter their economies from world markets. Initially, many of these
countries cushioned the shock of rising world prices by a myriad of commodity
and capital market policies that could not be sustained in the 1980s. These
policies tended to tax producers of primary exports, particularly the producers
of agricultural commodities traded in world markets, so that the price of staple
foods at the consumer level were below their world market counter-part1 The
reaction of the industrial market economies to the second oil shock resulted in
a fall in demand for imports and rising real interest rates. The fall in import
demand lowered the foreign exchange earning capacity of indebted countries,
while rising interest rates increased their debt service costs. Together, these
forces precipitated the debt crises which, as a silver lining in an otherwise gray
cloud, forced many countries to open their economies to world markets, thereby
increasing returns to their resources2
Nevertheless, a number of world’s economies, particularly in South Asia and
Africa, remain relatively closed to world commodity and capital markets. In addi-
tion, these relatively inward-oriented economies have poorly developed social and
physical infrastructure that tends to make them unattractive to foreign savings,
restricts their access to new technologies, and limits their potential for economic
growth. It is inward oriented-countries that factor importantly into questions of
‘See for example, Krueger et al, (191-92).
*The experience of Latin America is interesting in this regard as it reflects both extremes,
countries that were relatively closed to world markets during the 1970s to a situation of having
among the most open economies in the world (Rajapatirana,  and Alam, 1993). Several of these
countries are becoming major food exporters.
2world trade and food security addressed later in this paper. The world food sit-
uation must be viewed in this broader context since, as this history suggests, (a)
agriculture accounts for a relatively large share of total resources in low-income
countries; (b) economic policy and efficiency gains or lack thereof in other sec-
tors can have a greater impact on agriculture than events within agriculture; (c)
the majority of the poor and nutritionally at risk households reside in the rural
sector, typically far removed from the food policies that urban households have
access to; and (d) in advanced economies agriculture tends to be a small share of
the total economy but many of these economies are major agricultural exporters,
major supporters and suppliers of modem agricultural technologies. All of the
above have important implications to food deficit countries. .
The paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the world
food situation in the next section. After considering various factors including
the decline in the rate of factor productivity growth in agriculture, we conclude
that world food markets may deviate from the real price declines evident in
the past. Although a number of uncertainities exist, we do not expect a “food
crisis.” A rise in real food prices will place the poor at a greater nutritional
risk. This may be further exacerbated by the lack of growth in their export
earnings.We focus on policies to ameliorate food insecurity by arguing that
investment to augment world food supplies is not sufficient by itself in making a
dent in poverty. Instead, we suggest that economy-wide reform is a prerequisite
to sectoral reform. The paper concludes with a summaryof our findings, and a
discussion of two remaining challenges.
2 The World Food Situation: An Overview
The growth in world food demand will be influenced by dietary changes brought
about by rising real incomes and by population growth. Culture and other factors
may preclude non-vegetable protein consumption at levels observed in Europe and
in Western Hemisphere. However, the increase in the per capita consumption of
non-vegetable protein caused by growth in real incomes will increase in greater
proportion than the demand forcereals.3 U.N. estimates of population range
from 7 billion to 9 billion with a median projection of 8.1 billion by the year
2025. The median projection requires a 1.7% rate of growth in aggregate food
supplies to sustain current levels of per capita consumption at current prices and
income per capita.This projection coincides with the average annual rate of
growth in world food production of 1.7% during the period 1985-95. This is a
decrease from the long-run annual average of 2.40% (1961-95). If (a) per capita
3 For example, thepercapital consumption of pork in China increased by approximate 12%
per year between 1983 and 1986 thereby increasing by more than 2% consumption in grain
equivalents.
3income elasticity of demand for food is 0.18%,4 and (b) the world growth in real
GNP per capita continues at the rate of 1.2% per an.nurq5 then the growth in
food demand at current prices will exceed 1.9% per year. In the aggregate, a
1.9% growth in demand is likely to place slight upward pressures on real food
prices. A variety of factors would accelerate the movement toward higher world
food prices: population growth rates faster than 1.7%; a larger income elasticity
of demand than 0.18% in countries like China and India; a stagnant or declining
world agricultural production per capita.
As discussed below, evidence is accumulating that production may not grow
at historical rates, and, in any case, it is the variance in world supplies and stocks
that contribute to price “spikes” and consequently, to morbidity and decline in
human capital in low income countries, i.e., food insecurity. Moreover, even if
the steady state is maintained between food demand and supplies at relatively
low agricultural prices, no progress will be made in addressing the needs of the
1.2 billion people living on a dollar a day or less.
2.1 Agricultural Production and Trade
According to UN data, growth in world production has averaged about 2.23%
per year over the period 1961 to 1993. However, these long-run trends can be
misleading. As figure 1 shows, with the exception of 1990, world agricultural
production per capita has been relatively constant since 1985 but, this aggregation
conceals a number of important differences. The only group of countries showing
a continuous increase in production per capita, relative to the base year 1961,
are the developing countries. The developing countries account for about 85%
of the world’s population and include Asian and Latin American (LA) countries.
Starting in 1987, the growth rates of production per capita in developing countries
have accelerated. This coincided with the LA countries opening their economies
to world markets and consequently improving agriculture’s domestic terms of
trade (Rajapatirana and Alam, 1993).
The developed country aggregation includes the industrial market economies
of Asia, North America, Australia and New Zealand.. Their agricultural pro-
duction per capita relative to 1961 peaked in 1985. The least developed country
aggregation includes countries in Africa and low income countries in South and
East Asia which together account for about 10% of the world’s population. These
are countries that typically rely on primary commodity exports, and have not di-
versified into the export of manufactured goods. Their agricultural production
per capita relative to the base year peaked in the late 1960’s - early 1970s. This
decline is explained by relatively high fertility rates, a point we discuss later. The
JThis estimate is the income share weighted value of the estimated per capita income elas-
ticity of demand in high and low income countries.
jThis is the average annual rate of growth in world real GNP for the period 1980-92 reported
in the World Development Report, 1995.
4time series on world and regional cereal, crops and livestock production show very
similar trends to the aggregate series. The stagnation in per capita world agricul-
tural production has only recently been accompanied by a decline in carry-over
stocks. Stocks of coarse grains, and wheat have shown, with some fluctuation, a
downward trend since 1985/86 (World Bank, 1996b).
At the same time, the volume of world grain trade has not changed appreciably
since the 1970s with total 1995/96 grain trade estimated at 202 million tons -
not far off the average of 207 million tons per year during the 1980s (World
Bank, 1996b, 15). However, there are substantial differences in regional per
capita trade volumes among high and low income countries. Figures 2 and 3
show the quantity of cereal imports and exports per capita for the same grouping
of countries considered in the previous charts. Per capita imports remain the
highest among the least developed countries, although they show considerable
variation, and appear to follow a flat trend since the early 1980s. Per capita cereal
imports of developed and developing countries are nearly identical, exhibiting a
slightly negative trend since the early 1980s. The outstanding feature of per
capita exports of cereals by the least developed countries is that they are nearly
zero and, with the exception of 1993/94, are trending downward. These charts
reaffirm that the lowest income countries are dependent on world markets for
food, and shocks to world food markets can place them at considerable risk.
The stagnant trends in world agricultural production per capita and declining
stocks might suggest that the real price of agricultural commodities should be
rising in world markets, but prices have risen only in recent years. Figure 4,
taken from Borensztein et al. (1994) charts the permanent and cyclical trends of
real food prices over the period 1970-93. The striking feature is the permanent
nature of the long-run decline in the real price of food.6 The distance between
the actual and permanent trends shows the cyclical nature of the series. Thus, as
a measure of scarcity, this decline suggests that food has become relatively less
scarce, i.e., fewer other goods are required to obtain a unit of food in later years
than in earlier years. However, if the current increases in food prices indicate
a permanent change in trend, then the least developed countries are at a even
greater nutritional risk.
2.2 Food Prices and Capacity to Import Food
A decline in the real price of food in world markets does not necessarily imply
that food consumption per capita in low income countries will increase. Whether
food consumption per capita increases depends on a number of factors, such as
a country’s terms of trade, population growth, and growth in the countries total
factor productivity, a key determinant of real income. Suppose the country is a
net importer of food. Then, if the price of imported food falls relative to the goods
GThe price index of cereals is shown by  Grilli and Yank (1988) to have exhibited a downward
trend over the period 1900-1987.
5a country exports, the foreign exchange earned from exports can be used to obtain
a larger volume of food imports, and the country’s real total income has increased
by an the incremental decline in the cost of living. Per capita food consumption
will depend on population growth, all else constant. However, most low income
countries are not diversified; they tend to be exporters of primary commodities,
including non-food agricultural exports. The prices of some primary commodities
have fallen even faster than food, thus decreasing their export earnings and the
volume of food they can import without decreasing the imports of other goods,
services, and intermediate factors of production which often embody technological
advances7 For many countries, growth in their volume of exports per capita,
either from growth in total factor productivity, or from the effects of increased
inputs, have not kept pace with the decline in their terms of trade so that foreign
exchange earnings per capita have fallen.8
Households in low income countries which are net exporters of agricultural
products also face food security problems because a decline in the relative price of
their agricultural exports will tend to decrease total real income, and agriculture’s
GDP. Low income countries that specialize in, e.g., cocoa exports, if their rate of
total factor productivity growth in agriculture does not keep pace with the major
food exporting countries, their costs of production will not keep pace with the
decline in the price they receive for agricultural exports. In this case, they will
either export less and hence import less, or returns to labor and land will have
to fall, or both. Since the majority of a country’s poor reside in the rural sector,
they tend to bear the brunt of the consequent fall in income. Thus for a number
of countries, typically the lowest income profile, the fall in the real price of food
has not increased the availability of food on a per capita basis.
Of course, since early 1995, gram prices have risen sharply (Agricultural Out-
look, U.S. Department of Agriculture) in response to stock shortages brought
about by poor growing conditions in the US for the case of maize and wheat, and
the growth in import demand from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Taiwan. India has emerged as the second major exporter of rice, a major factor
off-setting the increase in the price of rice over the period from April to October
of 1995. The major reports on trends in commodity markets, while admitting to
a period of high price volatility, nevertheless forecast, from their 1995/96 highs,
a downward to a flattening trend in grain prices starting in late 1996. These
forecasts seem roughly consistent with current future market price quotations.
Coefficients of variation as a measure of price volatility are shown in figure 4.
‘I According to IMF (1995), non-fuel exports of primary commodities experienced large neg-
ative terms of trade effects during the early 199Os, and on a regional basis, Sub-Saharan Africa
experienced negative terms of trade during the late 1980s and early 1990s
8Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania are among the countries in Africa that have
experience a decline in, not only per capita export earnings, but in total export earnings (IMF,
1995).
6Volatility was high from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s and then rose again
starting in about 1985 when world agricultural production per capita became
stagnant. In the case of food, Borensztein et al. ( 1994) find that permanent
changes alone account for 73% of the total variance in food prices over the 1970-93
period. These changes are likely to include policy reform, financial liberalization,
and agricultural technologies in the US. and Europe. EU farm policies during
the late 1980s and early 1990s led to large increases in agricultural exports. For
instance, the EU increased its share of world wheat markets from 14% to 20 %.
Estimates of the effect of these policies on world market prices, all else constant,
suggest that full implementation of the Uruguay Bound agreement will lead to a
rise in the prices of the previously subsidized commodities. For example, Johnson
et al. (1993) forecast an increase in the world price of wheat and coarse grains,
and dairy products ranging from about 14% to 25%, relative to 1986 base period
prices.
Other uncertainties affecting world supplies of food include the net trade
position of the transition economies of the former Soviet Union, and of India
and China. Analysis by Mahe and Roe (1995) of the agricultural potential of
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) suggests substantial long-
run potential for increasing production in these countries. While these countries
experienced a deterioration of their agricultural trade balances in the early 1990s
the potential for export growth seems large when compared to neighboring EU
countries. Yields average close to 6 tons per hectare in the EU and less than 4
tons per hectare in the CEEC while the land under cultivation in the CEEC is
nearly 40 percent of the cultivated land area in the EU. CEEC growth in food
demand is expected to be modest. Improvements in diets are likely to occur with
rising incomes, but caloric consumption is likely to fall, and population growth is
expected to be modest. Thus, these countries should increase agricultural exports
if economic reform continues. Recent analysis (Wang et al, 1996) of continuing
reform and economic growth suggests that China will be a major importer of
food. It seems unlikely that India will be a major food exporter despite recent
exports of rice.Agriculture accounts for approximately 38 % of India’s GDP
and employs about 70% of Indian labor force. If economic reform continues and
incomes grow, it seems more likely that resources will shift out of agriculture and
into the production of manufacturers and services, thus limiting the countries
potential as a food exporter, in the long-run.
2.3 Growth in Factor Productivity
As noted previously, the rate of growth in world agricultural production has fallen
since about 1985, per capita agricultural production appears to have stagnated,
and recent evidence suggest a rise in real prices of grains to replenish declining
stocks. Are changes in the rate of growth in agriculture’s total factor productivity
(TFP) behind these recent trends?Our answer to this question is affirmative,
7but the rate of growth in other sectors of an economy also affect the answer.
In all countries, agriculture must compete with other sectors of an economy
for economy-wide resources, such as labor, material inputs and capital. If, in
the major food exporting countries, the rate of TFP growth in agriculture is not
sufficient to overcome the decline in the price of food relative to the prices of
goods and services produced in other sectors of the economy, then economy-wide
resources will tend to be allocated to other sectors. In this case, growth in food
production and in food exports will tend to decline thus placing upward pressures
on the world price of food.g
From the perspective of food importing countries, growth in TFP is important
to lessening the downward pressures on rural wages from growth in labor sup-
ply. Since many commodities grown domestically are not traded, e.g, those that
are highly perishable, growth in agriculture’s TFP tends to pass these efficiency
gains to consumers. These gains become a source of growth in other sectors by
increasing the amount of disposable income that can be allocated to other goods,
services and savings.
Recent evidence from the industrial market economies suggests that the rate
of growth in agriculture’s factor productivity growth is falling. If these efficiency
gains continue to fall, then the permanent nature of the long-term trend in the
decline of food prices shown in Figure 4 may be reversed so that the recent rise in
grain prices may be the beginning of a longer-term trend. The evidence provided
below shows that the rate of total factor productivity growth is falling in some
major food exporting countries in recent years, that total factor productivity is
strongly dependent on public expenditures on agricultural R&D, and that the
decline in these expenditures may be the cause of the decline in productivity
growth.
Table1 shows growth in agricultural GDP and TFP for selected countries and
years. TFP growth rates for the U.S., France,Germany and the UK range from a
high of 6.64 % per year for France to a low of 2% for the case of Germany, and 2.3%
for the U.S. While their is considerable annual variation in these estimates, rates
on the order of these magnitudes, if sustained into the future and approximately
replicated in other food exporting countries, would very likely cause world food
prices to continue their long-term down ward trend.
However, annual rates of growth in TFP appear to be falling. Consider first
the case of the U.S. Figure 5 shows that US agriculture’s TFP grew rapidly during
the 1949-1968 period. Importantly, notice that the rate of growth in TFP, with
the exception of 1979-83, shows a flattened to a slightly negative downward trend
9The standard neo-classical trade model predicts that if other sectors of the economy are
growing at the rate -y per year, then in the presence of declining agricultural prices, agriculture’s
growth in total factor productivity must exceed y by the fall in the domestic terms of trade in
order to hold the “efficiency terms of trade” constant and hence, with homothetic preferences,
the level of exports to imports.
8since the early 1970s. Figure 6 shows the pattern of TFP growth in the U.S.,
France, Germany and the U.K relative to the average rate of TFP growth in the
base years 1974-1978. In the case of all four countries, the over-all trend has been
negative. What is causing this decline in the rate of efficiency growth?
Empirical analysis by others, and more recently by Gopinath and Roe (1996),
show that the growth in TFP is explained by investments in public R&D, private
R&D, rural infrastructure, and by the embodied technological advances in mate-
rial inputs. The bars depicted in Figure 5 show the relative contributions of each
to TFP growth. In the early years, investments in rural infrastructure played
a dominant role in TFP growth while public and private R&D played a larger
role in later years as new infrastructure investments were reduced and infrastruc-
ture maintenance increased. While estimates of this nature are not available for
other countries, it seem likely that they too follow a similar pattern depending on
their respective levels of development. The cause for the decline in TFP growth
appears to be a decline in public R&D expenditures.
Alston and Pardey (1966, p47) state:“ During the 198Os, research expendi-
tures in developed countries grew at only one-quarter the rate experienced during
the 1960s; for developing countries the rate of growth slowed to around 2.7 % per
annum during the 1980’s, as compared with 7.0 % during the 1960s.” Private
sector spending has been proportional to public sector spending on agricultural
R&D, so it too has fallen. Alston and Pardey (p.56) report that in the 1990s
the public sector spent $0.79 for every dollar spent by the private sector, in con-
trast to earlier periods when the public sector spent $1.06 for every dollar of
private R&D. Their data show that in sharp contrast with the situation thirty
years ago, developing countries as a group spent more on agricultural research
proportionately than did more developed countries.
We are thus left to conclude that the decline in growth of agriculture’s TFP
appears to be international in nature, and at least partially caused by a decline
in public and private R&D expenditures. Given efficiency  gains in the non-
agricultural sector, the decline of efficiency gains in agriculture will likely cause a
decline in the already flattening level of world agricultural production per capita,
and lead to a permanent rise in the longer-run trend of world food prices. The rise
in real food prices are unlikely to pose a hardship on the majority of the worlds
population, but without other sources of efficiency gains, (which we discuss in
the next section), a rise in prices will likely increase the number, and place at
greater nutritional risk, the l/5 of the world’s population that live on less than
one dollar per day.
This risk may be further exacerbated by growth in the other non-agricultural
sectors of the major food exporting countries which will tend to further limit
their export surpluses of agricultural products. Notice in the case of the U.S.
that the growth in agriculture’s real GDP has averaged only 0.25% per year over
the same period, i.e., agricultural TFP growth does not appear to have appre-
9ciably increased growth in GDP. Why? The reason is that the domestic terms
of trade facing agriculture have been negative which has caused agriculture to
employ fewer resources than it would otherwise have employed had the price
of agricultural output not fallen relative to prices in other sectors of the econ-
omy. The relatively higher rate of growth in the U.S’s non-agricultural sector of
3.12% per year during the 1946-91 period, a rate explained by favorable terms
of trade, and growth in non-agricultural TFP of 0.62%, appears to have pulled
economy-wide resources from agriculture. During the late 1980s and early 1990s
these rates have trended upwards, forcing agriculture to pay higher prices for la-
bor, materials and other economy-wide resources not traded internationally than
would otherwise have been the case. While these higher rates of growth translate
into higher real incomes for US households, they nevertheless have the tendency
to incrementally shift the US’s comparative advantage away form agriculture and
to dampen its contribution to the world supply of agricultural products. If the ef-
ficiency gains in the non-agriculture sector of the major food exporting countries
does not spill over to the least developing countries, then the rise in real prices
of food are unlikely to be matched by a rise in their real incomes, thus further
exacerbating the nutritional status of the poor.
This overview of the world food situation suggests that if current trends con-
tinue, world food markets are likely to equilibrate at higher real food prices.
While uncertainties abound, such as the net food importing position of China,
it is unlikely that this reversal in trend will constitute a food crises akin to that
common to the widely circulated Club of Rome predictions of the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, it will likely place at further nutritional risk individuals among the
l/5 of the worlds poor that live in poverty, with rising levels of infant mortality,
adult morbidity and a corresponding loss in labor productivity. Given the uncer-
tainties, and historically the relatively high variance in real food prices, a more
disastrous outcome cannot be ruled out.
In the next section, we focus on policies to reduce the number of individuals in
poverty. We make the point that countries’ lack of resource endowments are not
likely to be the determining constraint to lowering poverty. However, we suggest
that policies which focus only on increasing world food supplies are not sufficient
either.
3 Policies To Ameliorate Food Insecurity
While investments in agricultural F&D in both high and low income countries
appear socially profitable as noted above, these investments alone are unlikely
to make a substantial dent in alleviating food insecurity for those in poverty.
Poverty occurs because individuals do not have the capacity to access resources
even those that help create human capital. Furthermore, those they have access
to yield low returns (e.g., unskilled labor). Countries must pursue policies to
enhance the capacity of its citizens to access resources particularly those that are
10under poverty line.
Experience of the 1980s and early 1990s suggest that policy choices are avail-
able, and the lack of factor endowments is not the constraint to increased pros-
perity. Many countries have opened their economies to world markets, and are in
the process of addressing institutional failures (e.g., the establishment of property
rights, enforcing law and order, and adjudication of voluntarily negotiated con-
tracts, etc.), and investing in the provision of public goods (important of which
is human capital, and gender equity in its provision). Many of the least devel-
oped countries pursue policies which lead to an inefficient use of their resources,
relatively high fertility rates, and poverty which becomes so persistent for groups
of the population that it becomes part of culture.
Narrow based policies (such as investments in agricultural F&D, or policies
targeted to the poor only) are only likely to be partially successful in “inefficient
economies.” In what follows, we first focus on the economic effects of economy-
wide policies that have particularly harmful effects on agriculture, and tend to
dampen growth in disposable incomes of the poor. Then, we discuss the impli-
cations of reversing these policies in the subsection Policy Alternatives.
3.1 Economic Effects Of Inward-Oriented Policies
Studies by Balassa (1986), and Mitra (1986) of country adjustments to economic
shocks experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s were later supplemented by nu-
merous country studies, and cross-country syntheses of these studieslo Countries
that pursue various forms of import substitution industrialization (ISI) polices
are referred to in this literature as pursuing inward-oriented policies because they
attempt to prevent world market prices for goods, services, and capital from pre-
vailing in their economies. Consequently, foreign trade typically accounts for a
smaller share of their GNP than would be the case if outward-oriented policies
were pursued. Outward-oriented policies are characterized as those that allow an
economy to be open to world goods and capital markets.
A series of studies directed by Kruger, et al (1991) for the World Bank, cov-
ering least developed and developing countries over the period 1960-84, focused
on the nature of these policies with special emphasis on agriculture. Fourteen of
the eighteen countries studied pursued various forms of ISI policies that implicitly
taxed (or disprotected) the producers of food staples by an average of about 29%,
17 of the 18 taxed producers of agricultural export crops by an average of about
41 %, and 11 countries taxed producers of import competing crops by about19
% of the relative price they should have received for their commodities.”  The
ironic nature of these policies is that they implicitly tax the poorest in society,
the majority of which reside in the rural sector. Results reported in more recent
“See Lal (EM), Corden (1990), Krueger et al (1991) and Little et al. (1993) for a review of
the key results of the cross-country synthesis studies.
11For these particular estimates, see Schiff   and Valdes (1992, Table 5,  p19).
11analysis by the IMF clearly show that strong inward oriented policies are associ-
ated with low growth in total factor productivity, low growth in real GDP and
GDP per capita, and low savings and levels of fixed investment (Table 2).l*
Briefly, the effect of the inward-oriented policies is to bias downwards the
returns to resources in agriculture relative to those employed in other sectors
of the economy. They tend (i) to push agricultural resources out of crops that
are traded internationally and into crops that are only traded in the domestic
economy, generally those that are perishable and those consumed by the farm
household, (ii) to induce a non-farm industrial structure that is concentrated,
unable to obtain scale economies, and often employing antiquated technologies,
and (iii) to bias downwards a country’s total investment in public goods (educa-
tion, social and physical infrastructure, electrification and other public utilities)
and to bias the direction of investment in public goods towards the urban sector
of the economy. The instruments employed to implement these policies invari-
ably include taxes on foreign trade, which typically do not generate sufficient
public revenues to meet expenditures. The frequent result is fiscal deficits which
lead to domestic and foreign public debt, and the monetization of debt which in
turn tends to cause other macro economic distortions such as an appreciation of
a country’s real currency exchange rate, and negative real interest rates. These
macro economic distortions further decrease a country’s exports and discourage
foreign direct investment in the domestic economy.
Effects (ii) and (iii) are particularly deleterious to an economy. In addition to
the economic losses caused by monopolistic behavior, high costs of production,
and the production of goods of inferior quality and limited variety, the effect of (ii)
is to limit employment opportunities outside of agriculture. Lacking employment
opportunities outside of agriculture causes labor to become locked into agricul-
ture, the consequence of which is farming on hill sides and other marginal lands,
small highly diversified farms, and a sector characterized by a mixture of modern
and traditional farming methods. This is a clear situation where economic policy
outside of agriculture lowers rural wages, and tendency to limit the scope and
lower the returns to what would otherwise be socially profitable interventions in
agriculture, including investment in new technologies.
Effect (iii) is also particularly harmful to agriculture since, as the review by
Binswanger (1990) shows, agriculture’s supply response is particularly sensitive
to public investments in roads, electrification, education and extension, and social
infrastructure such as well defined and enforceable property rights, contracts and
so on.13
l*To further dispell any notion that countries cannot change their position in the distribution
of the world’s wealth, see Parente and Prescott (1993).
13Using a dynamic general equilibrium growth model for Africa, Yeldan et al (1996),  find
that growth in real per capita income could be increased by one percent per year over the
period 19952020 if the ‘typical’ African country pursued trade liberalization and invested in
12Countries pursing inward oriented policies for an extended period of time
typically experience relatively high fertility rates. It is not necessarily the case
that population growth is an ‘economic bad’ as the impression obtained when
considering agricultural production per capita, or how growth in food demand
per capita. Whether population growth is an “economic bad” depends on the level
and nature of human capital embodied in the labor force, i.e., its productivity.
However, it is well known that fertility tends to be high in low income households,
and to fall as economic opportunity increase, and particularly so for females.
This can be seen in Figure 7 for the same group of countries in the Kruger et
al studies. Countries in category I pursued the most inward-oriented policies
while those in category IV pursued the least inward-oriented policies. Consistent
with Table 2, the more outward oriented countries grew faster during the 1960-
90 period. Moreover, those countries that were more outward-oriented not only
grew faster, they also tended to experience the largest decline in fertility over the
1965-90 period. Thus, policies to induce economic growth also provide incentives
to decrease fertility, and in the context of this paper, to lessen pressures on per
capita food insecurity.
Thus, while narrow based policies (such as investment in agricultural R&D,
programs targeted to the poor) will help to lessen nutritional deprivation, if they
are carried out while inward oriented policies of the nature mentioned above
remain in place, they are likely to be only partially effective,  and even then, they
may not be sustainable. The same efforts are likely to be far more effective and
sustainable in the context of an economy pursuing policies to maximize returns
to its resources, and in the context of a growing economy, to sustain the provision
of public goods.
In the next section, we briefly outline the nature of the more outward oriented
policies.
3.2 Policy Alternatives.
We focus on four policy areas: trade liberalization and reform, opening capi-
tal markets to foreign investments, non-distortionary macroeconomic policies to
maintain international corppetitiveness  (including tax reform), and the ameliora-
tion of market failures.
3.2.1 Trade Liberalization.
To achieve an efficient allocation of resources to meet final demand means “getting
prices right” within the appropriate institutional environment. To get prices
right requires world market prices to prevail in the domestic economy so that the
true opportunity cost of resources are revealed to decision makers. Granted, the
success stories of post WWII Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea, entail the
policies that identified selected infant industries for public support and protection,
rural public goods.
13industries which then eventually became competitive in world markets. However,
as Romer (1993, p88) and others have noted, it is unlikely that such a dedicated
and disciplined force of bureaucrats to identify the winners and abandon losers
can be sustained. Hence, until other politically viable institutions for fostering
development can be discovered, the one safe piece of advice to offer countries is
that integration with world markets offers large potential gains.
Based on the experience of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, it makes
little sense to get prices right if market friendly institutions are not in place so that
economic agents, and thus supply, can respond. Nevertheless, this is a question
of the speed of reform, not the direction and the ultimate target of reform.
Allowing world market prices to prevail in the domestic economy has strong
implications to fiscal policy and revenues. It means obtaining tax revenues from
sources other than foreign trade. Prior to reform, many Latin American countries
obtained a major source of fiscal revenues from taxes and tariffs on foreign trade
(Rajapatirana and Alam, 1993). To get prices right required removing foreign
trade as an important source of revenues, and obtaining tax revenues from other
sources. Most of these countries have only been partially successful in diversifying
their tax bases. However, they found that lower export taxes and tariffs did not
lead to the large losses in tax revenues that were initially expected, in part because
of the increase in trade volume that ‘reform induced.
In addition to the direct efficiency gains from trade liberalization, gains in
total factor productivity also occur as trade accounts for a larger share of GDP.
While various studies have identified numerous factors associated with economic
growth in real GDP, a significant variable common to most of these studies, and a
variable that is robust to alternative specifications, is the percentage of a country’s
GDP that is involved in trade (Levine and Renelt, 1993). Presumably, this
relationship reflects embodied technology in the imports of intermediate factors
of production, as well as the other more subtle and institutional factors mentioned
above.
3.2.2 Openness to foreign capital markets.
Countries that have sustained economic growth are characterized by openness
to world capital markets:Open capital markets characterize an environment
where both domestic and foreign firms can repatriate profits from local to for-
eign exchange. Domestic savers can invest in their own country, or on the Hong
Kong stock exchange. This form of openness influences the degree to which in-
ternational markets for final goods, services, information, technology and foreign
savings can interact with the domestic economy to yield a growth path along
which patterns of production, investment and capacity creation are determined.
Openness to international capital markets also induces product and process
innovations embodied in the capital and organization of production that foreign
14firms bring into an economy. l4 Importing countries experience efficiency gains in
other sectors too as these new technologies and organizations ‘spill over’ to other
firms in the economy..Second, to accumulate capital, it is often the case that
the domestic demand for capital exceeds the supply of domestic savings. In the
initial periods of reform, households are often reluctant to forego consumption
to meet investment demand at interest rates that permit a discounted steam of
future returns to equity sufficient to induce a more rapid expansion of production
capacity. Then, restrictions on foreign capital inflows lengthens the transition
path necessary for the economy to fully respond to new incentives. So, interna-
tional capital markets are key to shortening the period of transition to a more
efficient economy. From a political economy perspective, shortening the period
of adjustment to more attractive economic opportunities can lesson the pressures
of special interests that resist reform.
3.2.3 Non-distortionary macroeconomic policies to maintain interna-
tional competitiveness.
Countries that have managed their macroeconomic policy in ways that yield
relatively low and stable levels of inflation, and positive real interest rates closely
linked to the world market, have also tended to maintain a ‘competitive’ real
price of their currency relative to their major trading partners. Together, this
environment helps to keep a country’s exports competitive in world markets and
relatively attractive to foreign direct investments. The world provides numerous
examples where the mismanagement of macroeconomic policy has been extremely
deleterious to an economy. I5Mismanagement is more common in situations when
governments pursue inward-oriented policies, when they engage in only partial
economic reform, and when they fail to diversify a country’s tax base.
Managing the macroeconomic environment during transition from inward to
outward oriented policies are varied, with no clear consensus as to which strategy
in necessarily best. Some countries have chosen to pursue exchange-rate-based
stabilization programs while others have chosen a money-based stabilization pro
gram (Little et al, 1993). However, a recent review of these alternatives (Easterly,
1995) suggests that either of these approaches lead to output expansion if accom-
panied by balancing fiscal revenues and expenditures, positive real interest rates,
open capital markets and trade reform.16
14One body of endogenous growth theory suggests that new technologies embodied within
the imported intermediate factors of production spill over to the rest of the economy. These
efficiency gains spill over to other sectors as they employ some of the new skills learned in the
importing sector, and as some ‘ideas’ embodied in the new technology are reverse engineered
for employment elsewhere.
lS Empirical findings of Ramey  and Ramey (1994) and Fischer (1993) show a strong a negative
relationship between macroeconomic volatility and growth.
I6 Easterly(  1995)concludes that special interests will resist stabilization unless the gains are
very large, which supports the point that shortening the transition path of reform should tend
15Unfortunately, the pursuit of macroeconomic policies that are consistent with
an open economy does not mean that a country is isolated from world market
shocks. Instead, pursuing sound macroeconomic policies means that the economy
is sensitive to shocks to world good and capital markets and thus subject to being
‘buffeted’ by them. In the case of the Republic of Korea for example, the shocks
to primary resource markets in 1973/74, to energy in 1979/80, and then to capital
markets during the early198Os, caused relatively large shocks to the economy in
terms of raising real interest rates, and declining consumption (Little et al, 1993).
However, the affects of these shocks were short lived, and the economy quickly
returned to a relatively high rate of growth. The challenge is how to ‘insure’
the human capital of the nutritionally at risk that these shocks may otherwise
depreciate through increased morbidity, let alone human misery. We return to
these questions below.
3.2.4 The amelioration of market failures.
Countries that have sustained economic growth have been successful in resolving
problems in key areas of an economy where the market fails to allocate resources
to a socially efficient  end. Markets fail in the provision of social and physical
infrastructure. Depending on the economy and the level of development, this
infrastructure includes roads, rural electrification, education, legal statutes to
enforce property rights and privately negotiated contracts, weights and measures,
grades and standards. Further, markets also fail in the provision of credit due to
the lack of institutional capacity to establish low cost and enforceable property
rights to land, and other assets. The linkage between financial institutions and
property rights is the provision of collateral to private agents. Collateral permits
access to the saving of others through financial intermediaries so that investments
can occur and resources reallocated from enterprises that cannot otherwise be
sustained in an open market economy.
Other obvious examples of market failure include the provision of informa-
tion, agricultural related research and extension activities, and education, both
formal and informal. Of particular importance is gender equity in the provi-
sion of education, and access to labor market opportunities. Thus reform does
not necessarily require the lessening of governments’ involvement in the domestic




From our overview of the world food situation we are led to the conclusion that
the long-term downward trend in the real price of food is likely to be reversed.
to lessen political pressures to reform.
16The reversal is expected due to stagnating growth in per capita world agricultural
production at historically declining real prices of food. Upward price pressures
emanating from food demand include population and income growth including
the upgrading of diets which increases cereal equivalent consumption. Upward
price pressures from supply include declines in the rate of total factor productivity
growth in agriculture in the major food exporting countries, and the growth in
returns to resources in other sectors of these economies relative to agriculture.
These effects tend to pull economy wide resources from their food exporting
sectors with a consequent downward pressure on growth in their export of food.
The cause for the decline in agriculture’s TFP appears to be a decline in
the rate of growth in public support of agricultural R&D. As governments in
advanced countries have decreased substantially the rate of growth in their in-
vestments in agricultural R&D and commitments to international agricultural
research institutes, so has the private sector. Governments in some developing
countries also appear to be decreasing the rate of growth in their commitment
of resources to the development and adaptation of new agricultural techniques
and practices. Other supply side factors placing upward pressures on world food
prices include compliance with the Uruguay Pound by the U.S. and the E.U.
Sources of potential new growth in food supplies include the countries of East
and Central Europe and Latin America.
Uncertainties abound. They include these new potential sources of growth
in food supplies, and the net agricultural trade position of large countries such
as China and India. Another uncertainty is whether the export earnings of the
least developed countries that appear dependent on food imports will be able to
sustain per capita imports in the presence of a long-term upward trend in world
food prices and, for some, a decline in the relative price of their exports (figures
2 and 3).
Nevertheless, it is not likely that a reversal in the downward permanent trend
of world food prices will be termed a “world food crisis.” Since growth in the
world economy continues to lift people from poverty, the additional individuals
that will be added to those placed at “nutritional risk” will probably be small by
most world-wide standards, at least any standard akin to that common to the
widely circulated Club of Rome predictions of the early 1970s.
Herein lies a trap, however, because the result may cause an unnecessarily
ambivalent concern with the plight of 1/5-th the worlds poor that live in
poverty, which tends to be most pervasive South Asia and Africa. The poor in
these countries will likely be placed at increased nutritional risk with resulting
increases in infant mortality, adult morbidity and corresponding declines in labor
productivity among the poor.
The remedy to steadily decreasing the proportion of the world’s poor that
live in poverty and risk further nutritional depravation from the equilibration of
world food supply and demand at higher real prices, lies not only in increasing
17agricultural production per capita, but in increasing their real incomes. we sug-
gest that resource endowments in countries dominated by poverty are not in fact
the key constraint to alleviating poverty. Instead, drawing upon the experience
of countries having sustained periods of relatively high economic growth, and
from the growth experiences of countries that have reformed their economies, we
suggest a large dent is likely to be made in poverty by pursuing economy wide
policy reforms. Efforts to increase world food production per capita are likely
to be far more effective at reducing nutritional deprivation on a per capita basis
if carried out in an economy that is more outward-oriented. This is not a “new
view.” The equivalent has been advanced by others years ago.17
The nature of these reforms include trade liberalization, openness of foreign
capital markets, macro economic policies to maintain international competitive-
ness (including tax reform), and the amelioration of market failures. Another
benefit from policies that induce economic growth is the tendency for fertility to
decline, thereby alleviating pressures on the per capita demand for food. These
reforms are needed to reverse the effects of inward oriented policies which, in
general, have tended to decrease the returns to resources in agriculture (where
the majority of the poor reside) and more specifically, to push resources out of
crops that are traded internationally, to induce an industrial structure that is
concentrated and unable to obtain scale economies, and to under invest in rural
public goods thus further limiting agriculture’s contribution to the economy. In-
ward oriented policies also precipitate a number of macroeconomic imbalances
that tend to further increase agriculture’s terms of trade with the rest of the
economy and to decrease a countries competitiveness in world markets.
4.2 Two Major Challenges
Numerous challenges remain. We briefly mention two, the political challenge and
the challenge to carry the nutritionally at risk through short-run periods of food
scarcity.
In the 1980s many countries adopted outward oriented policies following an
economic collapse induced by a fast rise in the price of energy, a rise in real interest
rates, and a decline in import demand by the industrial market economies. Thus,
reform is difficult because the future is unclear and the political pressures from
individuals, and coalitions of special interest seeking to obtain from the state that
which they cannot obtain form the market alone become entrenched. Under most
circumstances, it is individually rational for groups within the polity to behave in
this manner, even though such behavior in the aggregate may give rise to inward
oriented policies with the deleterious consequences discussed above.
Countries that have achieved successful transitions from inward to outward
oriented policies have accomplished the following. They have (i) reoriented pol-
17See for example, Srinivasan (1982).
18icy to instruments that provide the least scope for rent seeking,18  (ii) induced
institutional changes that increase incentives for those disadvantage by current
policy to lobby and engage in political activity in their own self interests rela-
tive to those that will suffer short-term losses from reform, and (iii) use political
leadership and policies to reorient political pressure away from narrow based self
interest and toward the economic performance of the broader economy (such as
retirement programs with payments based on performance of the economy, and
more open factor markets to diversify sources of income). Whether the persis-
tence of poverty in poor countries can be alleviated will depend heavily on the
willingness of the polity to differentiate between the efficiency of markets, and the
efficiency of the public’s role in creating institutions to help identify and manage
market failures.
The second challenge is to carry the nutritionally at risk through short-run
periods of food scarcity. While broad based reforms of the nature discussed are
associated with successful economic growth experiences, impoverished households
will still be at risk to adverse food market shocks. For impoverished households
spending upwards of 70 % of their disposable income on food, the transmittal of
world market shocks into the economy (such as the relatively large coefficients
of variation shown in Figure 4) is likely to place them at serious nutritional risk.
As is well known, even moderate food price shocks increase infant mortality,
and morbidity more generally. Humane considerations aside, even moderate food
shocks “speed up the depreciation of human capital” of individuals in poverty, i.e.,
lower their long-run productivity. Given the high proportion of the population
that is poor in countries in South East Asia and Africa, and countries such as
Haiti, resources to sustain them through food market shocks may not be available
from domestic resources alone.
Of the various types of programs to target food assistance to the poor that
have been tried, for the most part, they have only met with limited success.
Moreover, if cost effective, they tend not to reach rural areas where most of the
poor reside.ig For the countries studied, Lal (1990) finds that direct transfers
and social expenditures to alleviate poverty did not make an appreciable dent in
poverty; in many cases these programs institutionalize poverty, and they tended
not to be sustainable in the longer run. Attempting to become food self-sufficient
typically results in a country foregoing its comparative economic advantage in
other sectors, with a consequent fall in national income.
Still while only marginally effective, the successful variants of the targeted
programs should be considered as an intermediate measure. For the transition
period to a more efficient economy, no feasible and obvious solution to alleviate
food insecurity for all seems available. If food price shocks are viewed as leading to
18Roe and Valdivia (1992) discuss the success of the Mexican government in pursuing this
strategy.
19See Srinivasan (1983) for a discussion of these issues.
19a potential long-term depreciation of human capital, i.e., the loss of productivity
in the future, what institutional structure might provide incentives to insure or
loan resources to the impoverished to carry them through the shock? Is there
some way in which the income stream from the human capital that did not
depreciate as a consequence of a “food loan” could be taxed to pay off the loan
after the adversity of the shock subsided? Since the productivity of human capital
tends to have positive spill over effects on the productivity of other resources (e.g.,
the positive externalities of learning by doing), individuals receiving the “food
loan” need not be the sole payers of debt service. It is unlikely that commodity
future markets can offer sufficient insurance to allow anticipation of future price
shocks and consequently serve to smooth spot market prices for food. Thus,
during a period of transition to a more efficient economy, a solution as to how
food security might be granted to those at risk in the presence of food market
shocks remains a challenge.
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Country a/ Agriculture Non-Agriculture
Growth in GDP Growth in TFP Growth in GDP Growth in TFP
(Mean, %/Yr) (Mean, %/Yr) (Mean, %/Yr) (Mean, %/Yr)
U.S.b/ 0.25 2.30 3.12 0.62
Francec/ 5.24 6.04 3.90 2.90
Germanyc/                1.76 2.00 2.90 2.40
U.K. c/ 7.02 6.40 2.40 1.70
Indonesiad/                 4.01 0.18 6.53 1.85
Indiae/  2.25 1.24 3.99 1.13
Chilef/  2.39 1.44 2.97 1.48
Kenyaf/                     3.33 2.24 4.39 0.19
a/The time periods vary. For the US, the period is 194491, for other countries
the period ranges from 197493. Chile ranges from 1961-82.
b/Gopinath and Roe (1996); c/Gopinath,   Roe and Shane (1996); e/Govindan,
Gopinath and Roe ( 1996);f/ Gopinath, Roe and Yeldan (1995).
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